Justice Breyer makes much of the fact that in 1978 Seattle settled an NAACP complaint alleging illegal segregation with the federal Office for Civil Rights (OCR). There is no ambiguity in that statement. How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious? boundary lines and executing school attendance policies that would create and maintain predominantly Negro or non-white schools, and in part by building schools in such a manner as to restrict the Negro plaintiffs and the class they represent to predominantly negro or non-white schools. The complaint also charged that the board discriminated in assigning teachers. . This sentence reminds me of Anatole Frances observation: [T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.[Footnote 1] The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. 2006). v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). But what about Seattles? The bulk of the data in the record was collected using the 10 percent band, see n. 1, supra. The districts past and current plans are not unique. 3 1996 Memorandum 58; Hampton I, supra, at 768, n.30. The Constitution generally prohibits government race-based decisionmaking, but this Court has authorized the use of race-based measures for remedial purposes in two narrowly defined circumstances. 1. Their decision leaves thousands Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) (plaintiff) were parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race. To hold to the contrary is to transform that test from strict to fatal in factthe very opposite of what Grutter said. [D]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3, p.8 ([W]e take the unqualified position that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action); Tr. Segregation at the time of Brown gave way to expansive remedies that included busing, which in turn gave rise to fears of white flight and resegregation. For the purpose of this section, racial imbalance shall be deemed to exist when the per cent of nonwhite students in any public school is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school. 352 Mass., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. The agreement required the board to implement what became known as the Seattle Plan.. There was no doubt that the county had operated a dual school system, McDaniel, supra, at 41, and no one questions that the obligation to disestablish a school system segregated by law can include race-conscious remedieswhether or not a court had issued an order to that effect. Code Ann. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. 6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (No Child Left Behind Act); 1067 et seq. And the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives demanded by the narrow tailoring analysis requires in many cases a thorough understanding of how a plan works. 1 of King Cty., Washington, and the OCR (June 9, 1978) (filed with the Court as Exh. See Milliken, 418 U. S., at 74142 (No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process). of Cal. Those schools do not select their own students, and education in the elementary and secondary environment generally does not involve the free interchange of ideas thought to be an integral part of higher education. None of these features is present in elementary and secondary schools. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination. The Courts decision in Croson, supra, reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de facto and de jure discrimination: To accept [a] claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for remedial relief for every disadvantaged group. Although there is arguably a danger of racial imbalance in schools in Seattle and Louisville, there is no danger of resegregation. Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the School Board admitted? Ante, at 6; ante, at 1516 (opinion of the Court). Race-conscious objectives to achieve diverse school environment may be acceptable. The issue here is whether the constitution permits, rather than prohibits, voluntary State action aimed toward reducing and eventually eliminating de facto school segregation. Our established strict scrutiny test for racial classifications, however, insists on detailed examination, both as to ends and as to means. Adarand, supra, at 236 (emphasis added). The Constitution does not permit race-based government decisionmaking simply because a school district claims a remedial purpose and proceeds in good faith with arguably pure motives. See also Adarand, 515 U. S., at 261262 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (This program, then, if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors). Section 4. While the Court does not suggest that greater use of race would be preferable, the minimal impact of the districts racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the necessity of using such classifications. In reality, it is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement. . In 1963, the transfer programs first year, 239 black students and 8 white students transferred. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 11691170 (CA9 2005) (en banc). Part II dismissed the respondent's attempts to argue that Parents Involved lacks standing. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. An Ohio statute provides, in respect to student choice, that each school district must establish [p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate racial balance is maintained in the district schools. Ohio Rev. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. It is reasonable to conclude that such resegregation can create serious educational, social, and civic problems. App. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half-century ago. Seattle and Louisville are two such districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth typical school integration stories. Most are not. In 2000, Federal Judge John Heyburn, after finding that the JCPS school system did not need to be under a court-ordered desegregation policy, ruled that race could not be used for student assignment placement in the JCPS school system in regard to their magnet school programs. The dissent overreads Grutter, however, in suggesting that it renders pure racial balancing a constitutionally compelling interest; Grutter itself recognized that using race simply to achieve racial balance would be patently unconstitutional, 539 U. S., at 330. in No. Pp. This Court in Adarand added that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. Ibid. See also, e.g., Darville v. Dade County School Bd., 497 F.2d 1002, 10041006 (CA5 1974); State ex rel. Subsequent to the District Courts dissolution of the desegregation order (in 2000) the board simply continued to implement its 1996 plan as modified to reflect the courts magnet school determination. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's decision. McFarland I, supra, at 837. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003); id., at 387388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Powell 35. No. Without attempting in these cases to set forth all the interests a school district might assert, it suffices to note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two interests that qualify as compelling. At least one of the academic articles the dissent cites to support this proposition fails to establish a causal connection between the supposed educational gains realized by black students and racial mixing. And the design of particular plans has been dictated by both the law and the specific needs of the district. Ibid. And federal courts would rightly hesitate to find unitary status if the consequences of the ruling were so dramatically disruptive. as a matter of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any constitutional requirements. Then-Justice Rehnquist echoed this view in Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Bd. Although racial imbalance can result from de jure segregation, it does not necessarily, and the further we get from the era of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segregation. When litigation, as here, involves a complex, comprehensive plan that contains multiple strategies for achieving racially integrated schools, Brief for Respondents in No. Most worked at unskilled jobs. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F.3d 1162 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). See id. In support of the third benefit, the District cites findings that minority students in fully integrated schools often perform better academically and are more likely to find work in an integrated workplace. It is not one in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial tensions. 1806, 20 U. S.C. 7231 et seq. 2002). of Ed. of Oral Arg. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated recognition that [a]t the heart of the Constitutions guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at 602 (OConnor, J., dissenting); internal quotation marks omitted). We have found many. The Seattle school district has tried a variety of plans over the past several decades to prevent the de-facto segregation that would occur if students were assigned to schools on a purely geographic basis. Each plan is the product of a process that has sought to enhance student choice, while diminishing the need for mandatory busing. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. It contends that race was used in a narrow way because the race tiebreaker determined the placement of only about ten percent of incoming high school students and was one of several factors under consideration. The fact that racial discrimination was preferable to the relevant communities was irrelevant to the Brown Court. In both Seattle and Louisville, the local school districts began with schools that were highly segregated in fact. Id. I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases before us and join Parts I and II of the Courts opinion. 06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. 1819 (The truth of the matter is that this is an attempt to place local mores and customs above the high equalitarian principles of our Government as set forth in our Constitution and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 6] Id., at 28a35a. Moreover, the school districts did not consider other options that might have been more narrowly tailored. The reason is obvious: In Seattle, where the overall student population is 41% white, permitting 85% white enrollment at a single school would make it much more likely that other schools would have very few white students, whereas in Jefferson County, with a 60% white enrollment, one school with 85% white students would be less likely to skew enrollments elsewhere. In this plurality opinion, Roberts wrote that the schools at issue contend that a racially diverse environment is beneficial for education and they submit this as the reason why they consider race alone in their school assignments. Just as the school districts lack an interest in preventing resegregation, they also have no present interest in remedying past segregation. Meredith joined a pending lawsuit filed by several other plaintiffs. The opinions cited by the plurality to justify its reliance upon the de jure/de facto distinction only address what remedial measures a school district may be constitutionally required to undertake. All this is true enough in the contexts in which these statements were madegovernment contracting, voting districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing state officersbut when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). To raise the specter of resegregation to defend these programs is to ignore the meaning of the word and the nature of the cases before us. And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nations children and how best to administer Americas schools to achieve that aim. Our cases clearly reject the argument that motives affect the strict scrutiny analysis. Furthermore, Kennedy found that race-conscious mechanisms can be used by school districts to further the goal of diversity, a position rejected by the plurality. Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. 1 ET AL. (authorizing aid to minority institutions). "But the district vigorously defends the constitutionality of its race-based program, and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it will not resume using race to assign students. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. Brief for Petitioner at 79. 4, p.86 ([Y]ou cannot talk about this problem just in a vacuum in the manner of a law school discussion), with post, at 57 (The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document). In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. Here the racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set solely by reference to the demographics of the respective school districts. Sometimes Members of this Court have disagreed about the degree of leniency that the Clause affords to programs designed to include. 1 See generally Seattle School Dist. Thus, the democratic interest, limitless in scope and timeless in [its] ability to affect the future, id., at 276 (plurality opinion), cannot justify government race-based decisionmaking.
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